- seems like empiricism, because you say that the senses "are the only source of truth"
Empiricists claim that sense experience is the ultimate source of all
our concepts and knowledge
- seems, broadly speaking, like a representational theory of consciousness, because you say that consciousness is a "modelling of what is being observed"
Like public, social cases of representation such as writing or
mapmaking, intentional states such as beliefs have truth-value; they
entail or imply other beliefs; they are (it seems) composed of
concepts and depend for their truth on a match between their internal
structures and the way the world is.
- seems like anti-realism, because you say that the "existence [of everything is] confined in the model".
There are two general aspects to realism, illustrated by looking at
realism about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their
properties. First, there is a claim about existence. Tables, rocks,
the moon, and so on, all exist, as do the following facts: the table's
being square, the rock's being made of granite, and the moon's being
spherical and yellow. The second aspect of realism about the everyday
world of macroscopic objects and their properties concerns
independence. The fact that the moon exists and is spherical is
independent of anything anyone happens to say or think about the
e.g. Berkley was an anti-realist and empiricist, so you may want to learn about his philosophy
If the notion of mind-independent existence is incoherent, as
anti-realists contend, what should we put in its stead? Berkeley
famously answered “Mind-dependent existence!” where the Mind in
question, for the good Bishop, was, of course, the Mind of God. Modern
anti-realists tend not to be theists and tend not to relativize
existence to any single mind. Instead of God they posit conceptual
schemes as that on which the notion of existence depends. To that
extent they follow Kant rather than Berkeley, though unlike Kant they
tend to be pluralists—it is conceptual schemes which they endorse
rather than a single transcendental scheme which Kant held to be
obligatory for all rational creatures.
I'm afraid I'm not sure how he would think about representation, and intentionality (how consciousness is about something). Or whether he would agree with you that our ideas are a "modelling" of the world we observe. My characterization of 2 is weakest.
It seems coherent to argue for anti-realism based on the idea that our beliefs are only true if they match the senses. I take it that's the argument you mean. This would be something like phenomenalism
the phenomenalist claims that to say that a physical object exists is
to say that someone would have certain sequences of sensations were
they to have certain others. For example, to say that there is
something round and red behind me might be to say, in part, that if I
were to have the visual, tactile and kinaesthetic (movement)
sensations of turning my head I would seem to see something round and
If it does have ontological commitments, and is not just a thesis on knowledge, these would likely be anti-realist, so denying an independent reality, be that ideal, physical, or dualist.
There are very few contemporary philosophers who embrace
phenomenalism. Many reject the foundationalist epistemological
framework which makes it so difficult to avoid scepticism without
There is also the probably intractable issue of how we "translate" "statements describing sensations" into talk about actual physical objects. I take it that's what you mean by beliefs "modelling" sensations, that all our beliefs about the world, rather than say the world itself, can be reduced to sense data.