Are Wittgenstein's propositions about death incompatible with momentariness?
I think mean that death, which is a cessation that is not lived through, cannot change life, and we are immortal outside space and time.
I take 6.431 to elaborate on, show the meaning of, 6.41, and how things that cannot be expressed in language do not change or have ends within them, like life and the will.
Is this incompatible with Buddhist momentariness? The immediate cessation of things which
pass out of existence as soon as they have originated and in this sense are momentary. As an entity vanishes, it gives rise to a new entity of almost the same nature which originates immediately afterwards... This doctrine of momentariness entails that change is not constituted by the transmutation of persisting entities, but by the qualitative difference between earlier and later entities within a series.
- Momentariness means life immediately ends.
- Wittgenstein means that life in the present does not demise (the cessation of the world we cannot experience).
- Then life in the present, "eternal life", is only ever in the present and does not demise.