All replies to the Chinese Room Argument (CRA) that I've seen assume the computer science concept (explanation, "definition" as Searle says) of the electronic digital computer. But what of other conceptions? If there are alternative understandings that are true to the hardware and also could allow the acquisition of an internal semantics, would this rebut the CRA? Even if it is not clear that an alternative conception allows inner semantic content, does the fact that (a) such an alternative exists, and (b) that the CRA has not addressed it, rebut the CRA? For wouldn't the CRA's conclusion then merely be that the computer science concept (i.e., Turing's concept) of the machine could never think whereas other conceptions that are true to the hardware, might?
John Searle takes the Chinese Room Argument beyond the Turing machine model in the "brain simulator reply" in section III in Minds, Brains and Programs:
The problem with the brain simulator is that it is simulating the wrong things about the brain. As long as it simulates only the formal structure of the sequence of neuron firings at the synapses, it won't have simulated what matters about the brain, namely its causal properties, its ability to produce intentional states.
Later he remarks that "formal properties are not by themselves constitutive of intentionality". These formal properties are not restricted to Turing machines.
Searle, J. R. (1980). Mind, brains and programs. A debate on artificial intelligence. The Behavioral and Brain Science, 3, 128-135.