First things first, think for a second:
Do you agree that a formal system must be both (1) complete and (2) sound. If that is the case, then wouldn't every formal system be truth providing?
Bearing that in mind, how do you think such a loose theory of truth be of use?
Think of it like this, suppose (X) needs a blanket, but instead of saying "I need a BLANKET." (X) instead says, "I need a big thick piece of cloth preferably temperature insulating." Though both statements are pragmatically "correct," but only the former resonates with our intuition.
It is not hard to see why philosophers have not looked into mathematical truths as coherentists.
Now, just to answer your question in a slightly precise way:
We have three dominating theories for now,
(1) Correspondence theory of truth (platonism, symbolism (Empirical), etc.)
(2) Idealist theory of truth (Not sure who holds this, but it is there).
(3) Formalist theory of truth (deflationary [personal opinion])
That said, these are the only theories of truth I have come across, not so much Idealistic. I have never seen coherentism, as it is defined classically, be used in the context of philosophy of mathematics. That said, you might be able to pass formalism as a form of coherentism... But, not really. They are essentially different.