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Here I'm not talking about "truth" in general ( as when one says " truth is correspondence between thought and reality") but about truth considered as a particular truth, as when one says " this truth has been discovered by Galileo".

Under which conditions can one say that two truths are one and the same truth?

What individuates "a truth" ?

A famous philosopher once said " no entity without identity". That's why the question seems important to me.

What is the "ontological status" of " a truth"? ( Assuming, maybe erroneously , that this use of the word " truth" is correct.)

Here of course I'm thinking of the sense /denotation distinction.

But there might be other aspects of the question.

Let me know what are your reflexions on this question ( or, maybe, which references could be indicated on this topic).

closed as unclear what you're asking by Conifold, Frank Hubeny, curiousdannii, christo183, Mark Andrews May 25 at 2:09

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    "Truth" is a polysemic term, so there are no identity conditions for "the truth" or "a truth" as such. If you are looking for identity conditions with respect to historical discoveries, this is actually quite controversial, and often involves a great deal of stretching and anachronism (as in saying that Galileo discovered the "principle of relativity"), but not really that different from the classical Ship of Theseus. Causal theory of reference is an attempt to conceptualize such things – Conifold May 22 at 22:53
  • There is no object called "a truth": there are true statments and false one. – Mauro ALLEGRANZA May 23 at 14:04
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    Quine touches a little on these points in his book "Philosophy of Logic" Tarski says the grass is green only if the grass is green. Then T. But is it really green? Phililosophy of Logic by Quine, Collège de France (1969: Philosophy of Logic course in French; 1979, in French) and in an English language book. – Gordon May 25 at 20:08
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    Conférence à l’Université d’Aix-en-Provence, 1979. Quine may have delivered the lecture in Aix sponsored by CDF. poincare.univ-lorraine.fr/fr/… Here is the English language book. amazon.com/Philosophy-Logic-Willard-Orman-Quine/dp/… – Gordon May 25 at 21:20
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    UW. It was easy. Here is Quine's log of travels and you can scroll down to France. wvquine.org/wvq-lecture-travel.html – Gordon May 25 at 21:27