This is going to come off as vague or obscure; but, I hope the idea is performatively expressed:

Two questions:

Do you think that Kripke would argue that the impossibility of de re counterfactuals only obtains for rigid designators?

And the following question as to one might reasonably speculate that de re statements are a fortiori rigid?

  • The first question might come off as opinion-based, but the answers to it will surely be interesting. I hope you get some answers because the questions are quite interesting. In fact, both answers are escaping me at the moment. – Bertrand Wittgenstein's Ghost May 30 '19 at 22:26
  • You mean if a=b implies □(a=b) then a and b designate rigidly? I don't think so. If a=b is analytic then □(a=b) even if a and b designate non-rigidly. Trivially, take a the last king of France, and b the same as a. – Conifold May 31 '19 at 9:31
  • Let me provide an example @Conifold: De re (rigid counterfactual): Ralph believes someone is a spy. (True in possible worlds where Ralph is not treating his paranoid schizophrenia.) De dicto (non-rigid counterfactual): Nobody is out to get Ralph because of XYZ. – Wallows May 31 '19 at 15:35

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