I've been thinking about epistemological solipsism, which seemingly necessarily follows from metaphysical solipsism. Namely, that the "world" of the solipsist is one and the same with the self of the solipsist. Hence, epistemologically, it would seem that a solipsist lives in a "world" full of certainty, and logically doubt cannot arise.

Is this some elegant "proof" to any solipsist committing a performative contradiction in doubting their own solipsism?

  • Seeing how people are mistaken about their own thoughts and feelings all the time I do not see why a solipsist (unless she is an omniscient God) should be so full of certainty. The idea that one should have perfect knowledge of one's own self certainly does not follow, let alone necessarily, it is a naive illusion. Even Hegel's Absolute Spirit has to go through all sorts of struggles to get to know itself.
    – Conifold
    Jun 10, 2019 at 5:57
  • To add to Conifold's comment, a solipsist can perfectly coherently (and probably should) hold that her epistemic position is much like the position she would be in given a non-solipsistic metaphysics. In any case, there have been very few metaphysical solipsists in philosophy. Solipsism is usually used as a reductio ad absurdum of a position or, in modern philosophy, as a methodological tool. Jun 11, 2019 at 2:58
  • How epistemological solipsism necessarily follows metaphysical solipsism? Epistemological solipsism is essentially a weaker form of metaphysical solipsism where one suspects there exists external reality beyond the senses.
    – tejasvi88
    Jan 7, 2023 at 11:28


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