Both Stephen Wolfram and nobel laureate Gerard 't Hooft think that the universe is a Cellular Automata.

As far as I know, 't Hooft developped a series of frameworks to build different models of Cellular Automata and Wolfram also proposed a framework where network nodes could produce different Cellular Automata universes.

Both of them proposed specific models of Cellular Automata to describe our universe (or rather they are working in a Cellular Automata description that can be applied entirely to our universe), but since they proposed a framework to create different Cellular Automata models, this makes me think that these authors think that literally every type of Cellular Automata correspond to a universe.

For example, apparently Stephen Wolfram in his book "A New Kind Of Science", chapter 9, he defines a series of network nodes that could be capable of reproducing all models of cellular automata. But I am not sure about this and I would need someone that knows better this field to confirm this to me

So, does anyone here know of this is correct? Does anyone here know these works well enough to tell me if these physicists think that every Cellular Automata model corresponds to a universe?

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    There is a current of digital philosophy (Wolfram, t'Hooft, Wheeler, Tegmark, etc.), whose proponents tend to erase the difference between models and what they represent. This might be pangs of growth, most proponents are not professional philosophers, and this line of thought might be developed more carefully eventually. But, at present, the answer is that they do not care if "literally is" means anything more than "has a model". For them, to be is to be represented, by automaton, or something else. – Conifold Jun 17 at 5:32
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    @JohnForkosh It need not even be physical existence. Their idea that "all is information" (explicitly borrowed from Pythagorean "all is number") does not even distinguish between what mathematicians call theories and structures. Information being specified already amounts to "existence", as far as I can tell. So round squares "exist" as much as round circles. Incompleteness is not an obstacle either. Some rule them out, but only by fiat. What causal powers these informational universes have to will themselves into "reality" is also unclear, they are even more ephemeral than platonic forms. – Conifold Jun 17 at 7:04
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    @JohnForkosh It is not so much that this does not match some prior notion of "existence" as that it is badly thought through on its own terms. Information as symbology is just scribbles. What gives it substance for us is manipulating it and acting on it. Information philosophers want to exploit the benefits of our intuition, but w/o paying the price, w/o making for a "manipulator", or introducing some sort of self-actuating "information", like Plato did. Presumably, those would be too fantastic, and so far they did not come up with something more palatable, so they simply skirt the issue. – Conifold Jun 17 at 8:41
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    @JohnForkosh Existence/being is one of those most basic notions there can be no "definition" of. The best one can hope for is building a philosophical system where it finds a place. Philosophers built plenty of those under the name of metaphysics, and disagreed profusely. If there is some common denominator, it is some sort of ability to act, to affect. Even when inert entities (like abstracta or possibilia) are admitted their existence is secondary, derivative. They exist by partaking in the existence of something else. – Conifold Jun 17 at 10:22
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    @JohnForkosh It is close, but much of uncontroversially real and concrete is neither repeatable (historical events) nor measurable (subjective phenomenology). And one can assign grades of being even to non-concrete. I remembered that I wrote an answer to What is existence and how far does it extend? a while ago. – Conifold Jun 17 at 10:50

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