I am confused about the relationship between sentences and propositions.
Admittedly what a proposition is has been controversial. I have heard people characterizing it as the meaning and truth-conditions of sentences on the one hand, and the bearer of truth-values on the other. According to the latter, it seems that only propositions (and not sentences) can be true or false (which might be tracking the data that it is true that snow is white, not it is true that "snow is white.")
However, I then lose track of what is a truth condition. Supposedly a truth condition for X is the condition for X to be true. If only propositions can be true or false, and they are themselves truth conditions, then they are the condition for themselves to be true...? Certainly in the tradition of understanding propositions as truth-conditions, people often say propositions are what makes a sentence true or false (e.g., in https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/#TruTruCon, the author says `` for a simple sentence like ‘Snow is white’, [Tarski's theory of truth] tells us that the sentence is true if the referent of ‘Snow’ satisfies ‘white’'').
But how can we reconcile this claim with the idea that propositions, not sentences, are bearers of truth-values? [p.s.one conjecture is that there are two notions of truth at stake: syntactic truth predicate, and semantic truth value. The "truth" in "truth condition" stands for the syntactic truth predicate - the condition under which it is appropriate to assign truth predicate to a sentence; the "truth" in "truth value" is on the other hand a semantic property of the meaning (i.e. proposition) expressed by a sentence]