According to the early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, the solipsist is one and one and the same with the world. He then makes the claim that solipsism coincides with realism.
5.64, Wittgenstein asserts that “Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.”
P.M.S Hacker provides the following:
What the solipsist means, and is correct in thinking, is that the world and life are one, that man is the microcosm, that I am my world. These equations... express a doctrine which I shall call Transcendental Solipsism. They involve a belief in the transcendental ideality of time. ... Wittgenstein thought that his transcendental idealist doctrines, though profoundly important, are literally inexpressible.
— Hacker, Insight and Illusion, op cit., n. 3, pp. 99-100.
Can anyone help me better understand this notion of solipsism that Wittgenstein professes in the Tractatus?
According to an answer I found on Reddit, here is a pseudo-proof of the notion of maintaining the consistency of solipsism with pure realism.
(1) Realism maintains that reality exists independently of the mind.
(2) His solipsism removes the mind from reality.
(3) For a solipsist without skeptical concerns (Wittgenstein), the world still exists independently of the mind.
(4) Therefore, his solipsism affirms philosophical realism.
Wittgenstein’s solipsism removes the subject from the world. In so doing, he shows that the world still exists without the subject being in the world. Therefore, his solipsism is consistent with philosophical realism.
Does this make sense? There's seemingly a joint discontinuity here between the world of the solipsist and the world at large.