(This is sort of a follow-up from this question)
Can dualism, materialism, or anything in between be empirically verified? There seems to be some disagreement here. This page presents both views nicely. Tryon, from this page, says that "The mind–body problem is actually a mistake based in ignorance." He argues that because of advances in neuroscience, reductive physicalism is the only way to go.
Sarıhan, on the same page, says that "No matter what detailed and direct mapping we establish between mental and neural states, there are so many options that remain on the table before we can proclaim that we have reduced mental processes to brain processes."
Given that no empirical evidence will truly disprove either side, it is a matter of probability. But can that even be applied here? Why, initially, assume that there is a 50/50 chance of either dualism or not (which, it seems, is needed for evidence to "tilt" the scale on way or another. If the prior probabilities are too different, evidence won't have any weight)? Why do we assume that our somewhat arbitrarily defined distinctions between dualism and materialism have any reflection on reality? It seems that you can draw this line wherever you want, and assign a "50/50" probability to it. Therefore, it seems that assigning any sort of probabilities is not correct. This would make the argument essentially immune to any sort of empirical work, would it not?
So, my question is, which view is more "correct," (either Tryon's or Sarıhan's) from a philosophical perspective?