Property dualism posits the existence of only the physical substance, but the existence of both mental and physical properties.
The teletransportation paradox presents a situation in which a person is exactly scanned, atom-by-atom, and the person is recreated in another location. Does the person "survive"?
It seems to me that the person would not survive. If another person in the future, or maybe even the present, happens to have the exact physical make-up that I do, it seems fairly obvious that "I" will not experience being that person. If personal identity cannot be transported through just another being having the same physical make-up that I do, then it seems that one does not survive teletransportation. For another argument for this, see this answer.
According to property dualism, the self is the set of mental properties one has. As Conifold states in this comment,
On property dualism disembodiment is problematic but "transferability" isn't (indeed we can transfer patterns from say acoustic to optical waves, but not "disembody" them).
This seems to me that the person survives teletransportation; one retains the sense of self through it. If one has the same mental properties, then they are the same person. However, this is at odds with what I said earlier.
If survival through the teletransportation paradox cannot occur, does that disprove property dualism?