Given that solipsism implies epistemological certainty of one's world, because there is nothing more to know than that what a solipsist knows about the world (implying that the world and reality are the same for a solipsist per Wittgenstein), then can a solipsist logically doubt?

  • Since when does solipsism imply epistemological certainty? If one can reason deductively then there is knowledge outside of oneself. One can use deductive reasoning outside of using sense verification. The view is typical of only a sense verification equal knowledge context. Objective knowledge for instance does not work that way. To science people x is true only if x is sense verifiable. This sense verification could clearly be misleading or mistaken. Hence we can only know ourselves for certain. – Logikal Aug 14 '19 at 17:23
  • Even if "solipsist" here means "Wittgenstein's solipsist from the Tractatus" (which is completely unclear from the post, by the way), where did "nothing more to know" come from? Wittgenstein took himself to be this "transcendental solipsist", but certainly not to be all knowing about the world. – Conifold Aug 14 '19 at 20:07

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