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  1. How does [1] imply [2]? Consider antinatalists. They have moral reasons TO TRY accomplish antinatalism ("AN"). But they don't have moral reasons to accomplish AN, because they probably won't accomplish AN, at least in the next 50 years. AN requires zero reproduction, and this is unrealistic when Earth has 7.8 billion humans today.

  2. Can anyone offer a better counter-example? Pls ELI5 - I never studied philosophy.

Herring, Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (8 edn, 2018). p. 113

At first this sounds a thoroughly convincing argument, but, as Paul Robinson has pointed out, those who argue that consequence should not matter are ‘a breed that exists (and will probably always exists) only in academia. I know of no jurisdiction that actually takes such a view’.157 John Gardner has argued that it seeks to prove too much:

[1] anyone who denies the existence of moral reasons to bring about results or consequences also [2] denies the existence of (normal) moral reasons to try to bring about results or consequences. So if one will not assess actions morally according to their results or consequences, one should not assess them according to their intentions either. If our successes do not count, then neither do our endeavors. With no inputs or outputs, there is nothing left of us as moral agents.158

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