Although the concept of divine simplicity is so poetic that I almost wish I could believe it, as it turns out, I can't believe it. Here's my argument:
- [Assumption for reductio] The creatrix is a se and the creatrix is not simple.
- The creatrix is not simple because if She were, She would not be a se, because She would depend on Her parts to exist as Her total self.
- Therefore, the creatrix is a se because She is simple.
- Also, therefore, the creatrix is simple because She is a se.
- But aseity is independence, and the above facts are not simple.
- Therefore, if the creatrix is a se and simple, She is neither a se nor simple.
This argument only tells against the "no conceptual parts" version of the simplicity claim. I fully hold that the divine nature is not divisible into changeable parts. But these are the only parts that would violate aseity for the divine nature to have; a deeper "no essence/existence distinction" form of simplicity is impossible (QED).
My question: this argument seems too good to be overlooked for hundreds of years. Is it really new or is it an echo of possible others from before?
EDIT: Also, if there's a better StackExchange for this, I'll switch it. The SEP is loaded with theology articles, including one on this very subject, which has loads of philosophical flare to it regardless, so that's why I started here...