Do Nietzscheans think not lying to yourself has intrinsic value? It's just a guess, that they might, even though Nitezsche claimed "everything is permitted".
I don't think it works completely in the abstract and universal sense (I'm not scared of water), but I also wondered if some ethical value/s could be taken from it. Perhaps e.g. humans are only malicious by way of lying to themselves (this isn't going to hurt them that much, I have to put myself first)
Perhaps those sorts of lies are preferable only to be freer from ideology and its distortions: which I think is critical theory (lite).
Our educated people of today, our “good people”, do not tell lies—that is true; but that is not to their credit. … [That] would demand of them what one may not demand, that they should know how to distinguish true and false in themselves. All they are capable of is a dishonest lie; whoever today accounts himself a “good man” is utterly incapable of confronting any matter except with dishonest mendaciousness (GM III, 19)
SEP (emphasis mine).
Malice has a root 'bad' (mallus) and mendacious 'fault' (mendum). Obviously different (latinate) concepts: but how are they related?