In metaphysics it is well known that all selective conclusions about the world as a whole are undecidable. Most philosophers infer from this that metaphysics is incomprehensible. I believe this is a mistake caused by ignoring the rules of logic and not accepting its results.
Metaphysical problems take the form of undecidable questions or antinomies. We ask whether this or that is true of Reality and find that both theories give rise to contradictions. As a consequence philosophers often dismiss metaphysics as useless or suggest there is a problem with ordinary logic then go on to endorse logical positivism, dialethism, mysterianism, scientism or the view that the universe is paradoxical.
Yet this pessimistic view only necessary if these problems are not only undecidable but also intractable. The question, 'Does 2 plus 2 = 3 or 5' is undecidable but not intractable. This is because there is a third option such that our question is not a legitimate pair for the dialectic. Thus we do not consider that this question is an indication there is something wrong with ordinary logic.
In the case of metaphysical antinomies we assume there is no third option but is this the case? If we do not know this then we cannot know whether they are intractable. The question 'Does the universe begin with Something or Nothing?' is undecidable, but is it intractable? This would depend on whether there is a third option. If we know there is not then we can use Aristotle's dialectical method to decide the problem. But we cannot decide it, and this suggests there is a third option. Yet philosophers generally arrive at these problems and go no further. They assume there is no third option and this is the end of metaphysics for them.
But here's the thing. For any system of computation it is 'garbage in, garbage out'. Aristotle's rule for contradictory pairs (RCP) states that one member must be true and the other false. If we do not know this is the case for a metaphysical problem then when we attempt to decide it we are abusing the laws of logic.
And, of course, we do not know. So when a philosopher studies metaphysics and concludes it is a waste of time (since all its problems are undecidable), as do Russell, Carnap, Chalmers and others in their scholastic tradition, this is not a conclusion of logic but an interpretation of its results.
In the example of the Something-Nothing question we find that both answers do not work. The correct response would be to assume there is a third option, just as logic is trying to tell us. There is no need to assume logic is flawed or metaphysics is incomprehensible. To do so is to ignore the RCP and reject the results of logic.
If we stick to the rules we can say that logic proves that the universe does not start with (or is not) unambiguously Something or Nothing as we conceive of these states. Rather than rejecting the results of logic and dismissing metaphysics as hopeless we can assume they do their job perfectly well but that Something-Nothing is not a legitimate contradictory pair of the form A/not-A. The same approach can be taken to all metaphysical antinomies.
This is an elementary point about dialectical logic but completely crucial. It is regularly overlooked or ignored by philosophers. The logician John Corcoran makes this point in an essay somewhere but I've never seen much discussion of it.
The additional piece of information that makes this an important issue is that the third option for metaphysical 'dilemmas' is the one endorsed by mysticism and the 'Middle Way' or neutral fundamental theory, which rejects all theories and counter-theories that logic cannot decide on the grounds they are not instances of A/not-A.
So, my question, with an optional secondary question, is...
Do most philosophers ignore the rules of logic?
Is this the reason why they cannot make sense of metaphysics?