Does Brassier say that perceptual objects are not paradigmatic objects? I think I stumbled on the claim he did, but didn't read, and have since given up on finding the phrase.

It would seem to make sense if he did. And in some ways I would certainly agree, else we're just going to rule out any particles that don't have a colour. But what about 'objecthood'?

What would it mean to import 'objecthood' from phenomenology and the everyday world? Would it be a category? What does science say about 'object'?

  • It does not make sense the way you suggest. It is fine for objects to miss some, or even many, features of paradigmatic objects, as long as they also share enough. We would need objects radically different from perceptual ones to make good on it. According to a Philosophy Forum discussion, Brassier's "object" is all-encompassing and covers anything one can think of, including properties, processes, etc. That would explain it. As for science, it has no need for such diluted abstractions, and the word is used opportunistically.
    – Conifold
    Aug 27 '19 at 0:49
  • 1
    See Quine's essay Speaking of Objects. Not science exactly, but at least closer than Brassier.
    – Conifold
    Aug 27 '19 at 0:57

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