Just looking at this wikipedia article

Putnam has claimed along lines similar to, but more general than Searle's arguments, that the question of whether the human mind can implement computational states is not relevant to the question of the nature of mind, because "every ordinary open system realizes every abstract finite automaton."

I have an idea of what the bit in bold means, but can't clarify it verbally because I don't know why I might, or might not, believe it. On the one hand, it seems a little new age, though, on the other, objections to computational theory of mind seem to be just as trendy (bad psychology rather than religion).

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    It depends on how one defines "realizes", see Chrisley, Why Everything Doesn't Realize Every Computation. – Conifold Aug 27 '19 at 18:00
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    This is an expression of the implications of Putnam's Triviality Theorem. The paper Triviality Arguments About Computational Implementation offers a detailed account of Putnam's argument. – Nick Aug 27 '19 at 18:53
  • I suppose it depends on what we mean by open system. But the fact that the human mind can implement a computation is trivial. Every programmer is taught to "play computer" with pencil and paper when chasing down a bug. You make rectangles to represent memory cells, you step through each instruction making the necessary adjustments to the contents of the cells, until you go, "Oh I see what I did wrong!" I don't see the relevance of the claim, since it's trivial. ps -- You can google around to find a video of a logic gate made of dominoes. – user4894 Aug 27 '19 at 19:05
  • i think i'll go with @NickR's link (first?). cheers – user38026 Aug 27 '19 at 19:05

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