To start with the easy problem of Consciousness - this is really more around the mechanics. It is asking about our scientific understanding of our neurological hardware and the processes thereon. It might even (does it?) include us coming up with some metric for consciousness which would allow us to say: based on this hardware and that processing speed on it, the metric is assigning you a 17 on the consciousness scale.
The hard problem, as I understand it is thought of, tries to go one further and asks: OK, you have now solved the easy problem - you have figured out how our (and perhaps that of other organisms) neurological hardware is structured, you can measure it for each specimen and thereafter assign a Consciousness value to it. Fine. But why would this emergence of Consciousness happen in the first place and how? To think of a physics analogy – in thermodynamics you might have figured out how to measure temperature and might have even discovered certain scientific laws that temperature adheres to. Yet, you might still not know when and how this quantity and its properties arise from its atomic constituents. In analogy, you could refer to measuring and predicting the behavior of the temperature of a macroscopic system as the "easy problem of temperature" and to knowing how temperature and its properties arise from the quantum objects that it is made out of as the "hard problem of temperature."
Some might not like such an analogy. In a sense, the emergence of Consciousness from how information is processed is more fundamental than the emergence of a macroscopic physical quality from its underlying microscopic physics. A question which captures the crux of this difference is Thomas Nagel's question: "What Is it Like to Be a Bat?" I.e. (How) can I really experience the consciousness' of other beings?
My question is: In how far is being able to understand – in the sense of "experience" – other Consciousness' part of the hard problem of Consciousness?