Is there something wrong about interpreting Kant's notion of synthetic a priori statements to be logical entailments?
I understand, I think, that Kant didn't want to say such statements (e.g math theorems) were a priori because the truth of the predicate was not in the subject. The truth of the propositions follows because of the way that humans think (synthetic), but don't require additional experience (a priori).
Now while Kant didn't mean something like logical entailment, that's how I want to see what Kant was doing. He probably didn't see such a thing because he was still using Aristotelian logic.
The reason I want to say such a thing is because, at least for the cases of math theorems. It doesn't follow from the definition of a triangle that its angles add up to 180 degrees (on a simple definition of triangle). One also requires some Euclidean axioms. So it's those axioms together that entail the conclusion.
In summary, I want to understand a priori propositions as true in virtue of a single definition where synthetic a priori deductions require several propositions.
Is there something wrong with viewing Kant's ideas like this?