Wittgenstein already sees the positivistic notion of 'words as object descriptions' as false. But he would probably not make the leap automatically from subjectivity to emotion. (There is a lot of space in between.)
Words are moves in a game, and the collaborators determine the rules by participating. Those rules go way beyond description, and even when they intend to be sheerly descriptive, they do more. They have connotations that carry impressions. So the choice of words, inflection, etc really carry information about the speaker in addition to the topic. It is the intention of the speaker to have an effect upon the hearer that is the real meaning, even if he is doing so through description of the environment. We attach the meaning to the usage because the group needs that usage, but most of the things we need to refer to are not about objects, including many nouns, e.g. 'love' and 'struggle'. These are actually concepts that affect us before notions like 'chair', and they form the basis for our usage to a greater extent than object references.
But this is implicit even before the notion of language games is introduced. It is clear that words like 'quickly' don't describe any objects, and that they are subjective expressions of an impression -- though not necessarily an emotional one in ordinary terms. Even for the younger Wittgenstein, shared impressions that resonate meaningfully form a 'picture' in composite, and that is what the word really refers to, not directly to any object.
When the referent is less full of subjective information, words may appear to refer to objects. But like Plato's forms, the 'picture' only participates in the environment, and it contains the real meaning. It refers to generalities instead of the single object, and its purpose is to convey an impression, even if that impression is a very down-to-earth one.
That impressions are basically complexes of emotion and experiences is more of an extrapolation, and a bit of an overstatement. But they are 'intersubjective' -- subjective data refined by exposure to others' similar subjective data. They never manage to just describe objects. Doing just that, without also conveying personal impressions, should be easier than doing something more, if it is in their nature of words to be object descriptions.
Clearly some large part of our impressions are sensory. But they remain our subjectively embedded, personal experiences of the sensory world. We grow into adult objectivity by 'cleaning them up', and we would not need to do so if they were 'objective' by nature.