If only the present in the A series is ideal in McTaggert's sense are we still obliged into accepting his C-series or something close to it, in order to account for the appearance of change? It seems to me fairly likely that we don't experience a real present, at least supposing we have no phenomenological evidence for infinitely small durations. But I'm much less sure of McTaggert's argument for the unreality of all tense.

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    C-series did not receive much acclaim because the idea of reducing temporality to conceptual containment a la Spinoza was long obsolete already at the time of McTaggart's writing. Even Kant was reducing it to causality, which he took to be synthetic, and rejected Spinozian identification of "order of reasons" with "order of causes". Husserl's analysis of phenomenology of time, including the "specious present", is a much more nuanced and tenable position, see SEP's Temporal Consciousness. – Conifold Oct 3 '19 at 7:50

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