1.Is this argument misconceived or is this inference correct, or are there other contributing lines of inquiry to the ontological
foundations of epistemology? For instance, is the philosophy of
language really distinct from the philosophy of psychology to an
extent that it should be on a list?
If ontology means the existence rather than the knowing it's a presupposition. The presupposition is the distinction between knowledge or representation on the one side, and being that is known. Where does the presupposition happen? In an academic circumstance the blind bigotry of a reception out of one's training determining the whole output is in play and a factor not to be underrated in its sheer power.
Psychology means literally the reasoned discussion about the soul. When it becomes experimental psychology it is simply the study of one experimental object that is no different from others in its status as experimental object.
Language can be studied as a matter of signs referring to beings. Thus under a presupposition of knowledge and things. In the German tradition, however, it is not studied in this manner since Husserl's concept of intentionality sets this presupposition aside.
2.Do those who argue against Quine's naturalized epistemology or moderate positions thereof reject that the philosophy of psychology
and the science proper are an ontological basis, and if so, who and by
what lines of attack?
If one treats logic as ontologically real, one can set everything else aside as mere subjective or psychological error. Thus, the claim that "not being is" has no ontological status, I look and see that something is positively not there, the not being is a positive fact, something is missing, but are the mere product of psychological appearances is only psychologically valid. Nothing is nothing for logical proof. The faith in the ontological reality of logic prevents the need to go to Phenomenology. Ultimately it is unsatisfactory and ever serious student of philosophy arrives at this view, as did Russell, because of the problem of primary intuition which happens prior to any logical neatness, but some still hold "logic" is more promising than abandoning the possibility of "knowledge" (which is no longer knowledge once it is accepted that logic is not a being, but a figure of subjective creation) of a repetitional kind for the dark path of phenomenology.
3.Do phenomenologists have a different approach to establishing the ontological foundations of knowledge given they do not subscribe to
the importance of physicalism, and hence the brain, which is taken in
the analytical tradition as that upon which the mind supervenes?
Phenomenology is based on radical disregard of a claim to a specific ontological priority. Say of the subject matter of physics. This is possible because of the denial of a project of possible representational knowledge. The knowledge would only consist in direct observation of the transformation of the phenomena. Phenomenology is the result of the Cartesian ultimate doubt without the project of building up from the doubt to a science. One starts with and stays with the doubt. Questions about the brain can still be asked, but judgment about any privileged foundation of phenomena are set aside.