I think the link between freedom and the good society and the idea of maximising freedom need a bit of scrutiny. I offer this below.
The free society and the good society
If freedom is the sole good, then a society that maximised freedom would be a good society. But freedom isn't the sole good; and I can't see any principle of freedom such that if that principle were to be applied maximally, the resulting society would be just, kind, empathetic, caring or embody any of the other of the plurality of values. I wouldn't be prepared to say that in a society in which these values were suppressed or overriden, it was at least one good element in the situation that people had had maximal freedom to bring this state of affairs about.
Freedom and the hierarchy of freedoms
Not all freedoms are of equal value, so merely maximising freedom is an inadequate social ideal. Being free to marry (or not) is a more important freedom than the freedom to walk in a public park; and the freedom to practise one's religion if one has one is more important than the freedom to buy a lottery ticket. Freedoms aren't like coins of the same value; some are worth more than others. Talk of maximisation masks this vital point.
John Stuart Mill and the harm principle
Mill greatly valued freedom but did not regard it as the sole value. His rule of freedom was constrained by the harm that freedom can cause :
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with[Pg 18] any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. (J.S. Mill, On Liberty, 1859: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/34901/34901-h/34901-h.htm.)
The notion of harm can take and needs refinement but harm to others strikes me as a limit within which freedom should be confined, so I'd endorse not 'freedom so long as it does not affect others' freedom' but 'freedom so long as it does not harm others'.