If you ask it, and you get a meaningful answer, then it is meaningful. This is an operational definition of semantics and is utilized by the Turing Test. The validity of operational definitions is based on correlation to establish dependence. Idealist and realist positions on the origins of math can occur in a nuanced way, depending on your flavor of idealism and realism, so there are hybrids between extreme idealist and realist positions. Platonism is a meaningful idealist philosophy for those who believe the mental and physical are not causally related. Platonism is also meaningful to those who reject the duality, because it embodies a prime example of a category mistake.
Since you can type it, I can read it, and we can have a conversation is strong evidence that the words have meaning. That it has been more than 2,000 years of discussion about the nature of origins of mathematics also gives credence to it being a meaningful interrogative.
Philosophers generally and mathematical philosophers more specifically have built the edifice of conceptualization and argumentation to provide a solid footing for answering the question since the time of Plato. How one answers the question largely centers around one metaphysical presuppositions. Today, Western philosophers largely fall into two broad camps: analytical (Anglo-American tradition) and phenomenological (Continental tradition) philosophers; the former tend towards objective analysis and the latter towards subjective introspection, which roughly speaking, are two broad approaches to rational and empirical thinking.
The answers you seek will depend on epistemic attitude and ontological commitment. One of the most important determinants of the answer you seek is whether you accept supervenience and reject Cartesian duality. Relatively contemporary philosophers of mind and general philosophers (starting with the ordinary language philosophers) like Ryle, Quine, Searle, Kim, Dennett, and others do. In these philosophers' estimation, the physical is the grounding ontology, and if you accept additional ontologies such as the mental (Dennett is eliminative materialist), then in some way they partially or fully reduce to the physical.
What are the implications, then, for the origins of mathematics? In essence, many ontological and epistemological questions are reduced to questions of psychology. This position, known as psychologism, which was is an influential theory that goes back to the 19th-century German mathematicians and philosophers who are largely responsible for pushing the mathematical program of foundationalism forward. See the SEP article early set theory for a brief description of how set theory became the foundational branch of mathematics and led to model theory and proof theory.
Today, in the 21st century, one academic discipline which bears tremendously is cognitive science which includes psycholinguistics which has a direct, scientific bearing on the notion of mathematical conceptualization and language. For philosophers who have hearkened to Quine's naturalized epistemology, the question is largely settled. All information, including mathematical information, is constructed by the brain of which the mind is a mere property, and mathematical thinking is a subset of the broader notion of cognition. Of course, many well-educated philosophers reject the rejection of Cartesian duality and insist mathematics does not depend on the mind. Whether or not one accepts Platonic Ideals, the theory is meaningful, because acceptance and rejection of theories is a matter of truth, which is a selection of which meaningful theory is the correct one.
See these SE posts:
Is mathematics a mental idea.
A comprehensive introduction to relationship between math and experience
Is mathematics truth