I'm going to reduce your statements presuming that the reformulation is accurate; please let me know if it's not.
Knowledge is structured by propositions articulated by people who from experience construct them with "biases", cognitive or otherwise. Since the "bias" is built into the process, somehow, all knowledge is itself "biased". Thus, where knowledge exists, it is necessary that "bias" exists.
Yes, this is a prevalent theme in a number of Analytical and Continental philosophies. Critical theory, for instance, presumes that not only is this the case, but it is used for one group of people to maintain a power imbalance over another. Deconstruction is a philosophy that challenges the notion that a text is easily understood, if understood at all, given differences in the biases of the author and the reader. Quine's arguments about the indeterminancy of translation might also be seen as problems regarding a coherence between structures of knowledge. Lastly, in the philosophy of mind, embodied realism can be understood as all knowledge being built on a particular bias rooted in the nature of physical being and experience.
Since my interest is the the analytical tradition with a strong emphasis on the philosophy of language, I'll respond from regarding the theory of embodied cognition, which is a philosophical theory built on the findings of the linguistic turn and the naturalized epistemology that includes cognitive science.
In philosophy, meaning is the lynchpin. No meaning, no knowledge, plain and simple. Thus, let's lay bare that semantics has some light to shed on philosophy, which is uncontroversial in analytical philosophy. First, you need to wrap your mind around the fact there are multiple theories that go into meaning. Certainly, Gottlob Frege's paper Über Sinn und Bedeutung which posits the distinction of sense and reference is important. But, the philosophy of language has grown since. From Szabó and Thomason's Philosophy of Language, page 196:
[The] conservative approach to pragmatics has the advantage of being congenial to linguistic theorizing...[but it] excludes many important aspects of language use... Even simple utterances are ambiguous... "natural language understanding" draws... heavily on world knowledge and common sense.
From artificial intelligence, we know, that common sense is a tremendous difficulty to overcome in computational linguistics and improving computational intelligence exactly because common sense is a series of propositions of knowledge that are essentially biases in the structure of knowledge. That's to say, that common sense is viewed as a structure and method of knowledge, thus both ontological and epistemological knowledge, which is highly normative; unless that normativity is explicitly specified by codified ontology, computers simply don't have the ability to decide what are axiological conditions.
The question that has been looming since Turing's test, is, how to deal with this bias in propositions that arise from intuition such as common sense, folk psychology, or naive physics. It's a deep philosophical dilemma that lies at the basis of the question in computational linguistics that asks, for instance, 'How should a computer know when 'tall' is used as an adjective when using different nouns in different contexts?'. And in the philosophy of language, it is a universal consensus that there is no solution yet to the problem.
Now, from the philosophical theory of embodied realism, there is a broad solution of sorts. One has to abandon truth-conditional semantics and find a theory of semantics that somehow captures where this meaning comes from in a way that goes beyond the notions of truth and falsity. There's a school of thinking called cognitive semantics that seeks to pick up where later Wittgensteinian thought leaves off with ideas like language-games and family resemblance.
In short, cognitive semantics posits where the "bias" in language comes from. It comes from the neurons in our brain which makes the philosophical theory a both a psychologist and conceptualist theory of mind since it quite literally addresses how the brain and the basic categories relate to the "bias" you are referring to. This is why as a philosophical theory, one has to accept Quine's advocacy of using scientific, and thus psychological propositions, in philosophical reasoning. While the article on embodied cognition covers the various proposed structures, three important ideas are that of prototype theory of definition, conceptual metaphor of meaning, and ontological neural computation, all of which inhabit niches of classical philosophical problems.
So, there are philosophies that certainly recognize the tendency of biases and preferences in meaning, and explore exactly what they are. I've tried to review what current embodied realism entails, though a much better start would be Johnson and Lakoff's Philosophy in the Flesh. In it, the main thesis is that knowledge is never objective and disembodied, but rather biased on account of certain dispositions (SEP) of biochemicals and teleological functions of biological processes (SEP) that inevitably lead to a disposition to normativity including informal fallacy, cognitive biases, defeasibility in argumentation, as well as explaining the very nature of semantics itself. In this way, propoponents absolutely accept that where knowledge exists, it is necessary that "bias" exists.