The following account of Husserlian phenomenological reduction might make clearer what is involved in the reduction. Some of Husserl's characterisations of the reduction come close to examples; and in the References there are suggestions for further reading in which examples are to be found:
We must begin by rehearsing, once again, Husserl's descriptions of the
transcendental-phenomenological reduction. There are a number of
different ways of approaching the reduction. One may follow Descartes
on his road of total doubt. Alternatively one may examine one of the
traditional philosophic disciplines, e.g., logic, in an attempt to uncover
the aims implicit in its developmental By either way one is led to question
what had previously seemed self-evident. On the Cartesian road we are
led to question all presuppositions of human experience; in logic the
presuppositions of judging, of validity and truth become questionable.
We begin, then, by questioning what we had previously taken for granted,
or by wondering at what seems most familiar. This involves a change of attitude (Einstellung);we must look at the world with "new eyes." What
exactly is this new attitude which I adopt as I perform the transcendental-
phenomenological reduction? Here Husserl provides a variety of phrases
designed to exhibit this new attitude to the reader: I no longer attach any
validity to the "natural belief in the existence of what I experience";
I "invalidate," "inhibit," "disqualify," all commitments (Stellungnahmen)
with reference to experienced objects; I "bracket the objective world."
This last is one of the best-known phrases used in this connection. Husserl
draws his metaphor from mathematics where we place an expression in
brackets and put a + or - sign in front of it. By thus bracketing the objective world we "give it a different value." In performing the reduction,
the phenomenologist establishes himself as "disinterested spectator"
and changes his practical aims. The result of this change of attitude is a
change in my experience. Previously experienced reality now becomes
"mere phenomenon." This Kantian term is here used in a new sense; any
object of experience becomes "phenomenon" for the observer who recognizes the object's claim to reality, but reserves decision on the validity of
that claim. In the "natural," preanalytic and prephenomenological attitude - sometimes Husserl also calls it the "naive" attitude, but not in
any pejorative sense - we generally believe that objects perceived are real;
we believe that we live in a real world. This belief is "put out of action,"
suspended, we make no use of it. We are left with a world-as-phenomenon,
a world which claims to be; but we refuse, for the time being, to pass on
the validity of these claims.
A further result of this movement is the discovery of the transcendental
ego. I suddenly recognize that it is I who must decide whether the claims
to reality of the objects of experience in particular, and of the world as a
whole in general, are valid claims. I discover that whatever has sense and
validity, has sense and validity for me. I thus discover the "absolute
being of the transcendental ego." "Absolute being (Seiendes) is in the
form of an intentional life which, whatever else it may be aware of in itself, is at the same time awareness of itself." The "I" which transforms the
world into mere phenomenon is, in so doing, aware of itself as transforming
the world and cannot be subjected to the same transformation. But apart
from its "modes of relatedness" and its "modes of behavior," this "I" is
completely devoid of any content which could be studied or explicated.
It is completely indescribable, being no more than a pure ego.'
Husserl insists that the transcendental-phenomenological reduction in
no way limits experience. The phenomenologist does not turn away either
from the whole of experienced reality and actuality or from certain areas
of it; he only suspends judgment concerning the reality or validity of
what is experienced. The world before the transcendental-phenomeno-
logical reduction and the world which I have transformed into "mere
phenomenon" do not differ in content, but in the way in which I am
related to each of them. (Richard Schmitt, 'Husserl's Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Dec., 1959), pp. 238-245: 239-40.)
Dan Zahavi, Husserls Phenomenology, ISBN 10: 0804745463 / ISBN 13: 9780804745468
Published by Stanford University Press, 2003.
Joseph J. Kockelmans, Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology, ISBN 10: 1557530505 / ISBN 13: 9781557530509
Published by Purdue University Press, 1994.
James M. Edie, Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology, ISBN 10: 0253204119 / ISBN 13: 9780253204110
Published by Indiana University Press, 1987.
E. Pivcevic, Husserl and Phenomenology, London: Hutchinson, 1970.