(1) All the swans observed until today were white.
(2) Therefore, all swans are white.
This is a strong inductive reasoning ( although the conclusion is false).
When I reason like this, I'm not looking for the "probable color" of swans, but about the color of swans.
I mean I am not looking for a probability.
It seems to me that the probability is not part of the conclusion itself, but belongs to the relation between the premises and the conclusion in an inductive inference.
Trying to infer probability statements ( statements regarding the probability for a given proposition to be true) may be the job of deductive reasoning ( rather than of inductive reasoning).
If I introduce the concept of probability in the conclusion itself, the reasoning is arguably no longer an inductive one.
(1) If bought a lotery ticket 300 times.
(2) I never won.
(3) Therefore, there is a high probability me to lose the next time I by a ticket.
Suppose this reasoning is inductive. It means that it is not deductive, and therefore, not deductively valid.
But how could it be the case (1) the premises to be true and (2) the conclusion to be false?
I mean, could it be the case that (1) I've lost 100% of times I have bought a ticket and (2) there is not a high probability me to lose the next time I'll by one?