My understanding is that for a moral realist, moral statements are propositions that have a true/false property that can guide reasoning. However, most articles I have read do not talk about what definition of "truth" they recommend using: is it correspondence? coherence? minimalism?
The Moral Realism, Semantics article on SEP about moral truths illustrates this quite well. On one hand, it seems like moral realists can redefine "truth" to denote a property in a minimalist sense making it hard to refute moral truths. On the other hand anti-realists can either question the redefinition or make further clarifications (as outlined in ) that make their stance seem much more draconian. As an observer, these disagreements seem more like word games without much insight. Am I missing something?
Another paragraph in Robert Audi's "Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge" says (page 270):
Noncognitivism must not be taken to imply that in moral matters "anything goes." It is still possible to hold an unreasonable moral attitude, say one based on misinformation or prejudice. The view can thus allow that there are even moral mistakes. But mistakes that are specifically moral are mistakes in attitude, not about what is true or false.
This seems to move the discussion from what "truth" means to what "attitude" means.