(1) I see a tree.
(2) Therefore the tree is the object of my perception.
(3) So I see the object of my perception.
(4) Hence, without grasping the concept of object in general and subsuming the diversity of sense impressions under this concept, I could not perceive the tree.
(5) Hence, the concept of an object in general in an a priori condition of my knowledge of the external world.
(1) Is this reasoning a reasonable reconstruction of Kant's argument in the Transcendantal Logic part of the Critique of Pure Reason?
(2) In case it is, isn't there a fallacy in the inference from (1) to (3) , a fallacy consisting in a confusion between direct knowledge and the reflective description of knowledge?
My argument to assert Kant is committing this fallacy is that one need not identify a tree as an " object" to actually see a tree.
Children do not grasp the concept of " object" ( which is a higher-order concept); notwithstanding, a child is perfectly able to see a tree.