So my question, essentially, is this: is there any reasonable way in which one can say that mathematical Platonism is compatible with Kantian constructivism?
For the sake of context, I was asked to explain this idea for a college interview, after saying that I found it to be preferable to Platonism in it's original form.
Essentially, I said that this sort of synthesis is the only way of solving the problem of how we can access the realm of forms. In particular, I suggested that the Kantian view of mathematics (unlike, say, formalism) allows still for forms to exist as objective entities, albeit of the perception rather than of objective reality. Additionally, I said that under Kantianism, the idea that the forms "project themselves" onto the world is still preserved - and that the only difference is that Kantianism suggests the projection is "in - out" (from the forms of perception to things in themselves) rather than "out - in" in the Platonic sense (from the "outer" world of forms to the world of appearances).
Does this sound stupid? Or is there a real sense in which "Kantian Platonism" can be a tennable position?
P.S. I am in high school, and I have never learned philosophy formally.