I read Quine's Two Dogmas, and I also read two of Harman's papers:'Doubts about Conceptual Analysis,' and 'Analyticity Regained?' I have a couple of observations: Both Quine and Harman adopt a kind of holism. Quine thinks that analyticity is not to be understood in terms of verificationism, and his argument from this involves confirmation-holism (I'm not sure what this amounts to either, but that's a separate question). Harman, on the other hand, disagrees with quine along with pretty much everyone else that 'meaning' can be made sense of. But Harman doesn't think that analyticity can be made sene of in terms of meaning because meaning-holism is true. So I have two questions:
- What is theory of meaning-holism that Harman endorses and how does it differ from Quine's confirmation holism?
- How would meaning-holism be a problem for the analytic-synthetic distinction?