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Kant's universalizability principle (theory), which he set out in 18th century, tells us that if a course of action cannot be universally adopted it must be morally impermissible. So in that case what is the actual standing of LGBT?
(I'm not good at English, pardon me.)
As I explained here, that's just not how the categorical imperative works.
A maxim is a general practical rule which has the structure "If I am in situation X and want to achieve the goal Y, I will do Z." - a structure which hardly is to bring into conformity with sexual orientation. Sexual orientation is not an action you can perform, according to every credible scientific account of it it isn't even a choice (except for those who choose to "be" - rather pretend to be - LGTB or heterosexual out of social calculus without feeling it).
If there is no voluntary choice involved, it makes no sense to even speak of it being moral or immoral. Is it immoral for the tortured to confess to a crime they did not conduct, ie. to lie? Is it immoral to grab my spoon with my left rather than my right hand when I am alone at home? Is it immoral to have (not speaking of act according to) the character traits one has? In the latter two cases, I could construct moral reasons to work on certain things in practice, ie. in certain social contexts, but per se, these things are just amoral.
Morality is a social phenomenon. And it involves spheres of freedom. If two LGTB people live their lives and sexual orientation without bothering others - why should that restrict any third party's freedom in any way? If they offensively show off their sexuality in the public sphere that's another game, but there are limits to this regardless the sexual orientation. For example, there are countries where public kissing is morally and legally forbidden - for heterosexual partners no less.
But hold a second, there obviously are actions involved! What about them? Having put obvious problems like public sex etc. out of the way, this is still worth additional consideration.
Let's take "If I want my sexual needs to be satisfied, I will only do so with same-sex partners". This obviously is not universally acceptable, so homosexuality is immoral to Kant, isn't it?
Well, probably not. This proposed maxim is probably simply too specific to actually be a maxim of the kind Kant had in mind there (for more detail and sources for further reading, see the link above). If you take "If I want to satisfy my sexual needs, I will only do so in a consensual manner with the sex I prefer" instead, there is no internal or general inconsistency in having it universally adopted (as far as I am aware of).
So what's the difference here? The CI asks you exactly to step back from your very personal inclinations and demands you to adopt only those acting principles (maxims) which a) are reasonable to be adopted by all rational beings and b) do not end up in inconsistencies if that happens. And, accordingly, there are maxims which allow for LGBTQ+ without any problems and if they are what you are enacting, there's nothing morally wrong with it. But if your maxims are only involving your own personal feelings and gain, this will end up being morally wrong.
Mind, two different maxims may result in the very same action, but moral worth, for Kant, is determined by the principles behind your action - your character as he calls it in later works - not the action itself.
As long as it is not enacted in a morally wrong way, sexual orientation as such is amoral. And this has nothing to do with the categorical imperative at all. And if you are LGBTQ+ wanting to have sex, you may very well act following a morally permissible maxim.
Kant's universalizability principle (theory), ... tells us that if a course of action cannot be universally adopted it must be morally impermissible. So in that case what is the actual standing of LGBT?
Philip makes a good point that one's un-enacted sexual desires or background inclinations of various sorts do not cause a person to commit evil, or any other action upon which we could pass moral judgment. It would be like saying "I felt a temptation to steal, which was contrary to my own will, and I resisted. Therefore I am a thief!" Only giving way to an inclination or temptation brings upon oneself the moral consequences of the action.
Kant expressed his categorical imperative as "Act as though the maxim of your action were to become, through your will, a universal law of nature." (emphasis added)
This means that one must consider actions and policies of action in order to apply the imperative. Philip is right that a background condition that is unrelated to one's choices is not a candidate for a maxim (policy) of action and thus cannot be evaluated in this framework, being amoral. However, since our society routinely conflates circumstance with intentional action (and not infrequently via these labels), I think it would be worthwhile to examine various policies and see what we can deduce by applying Kant's imperative.
Therefore, the answer without qualification would be: Yes and no. Yes with regard to behaviors or policies arising from LGBT inclinations, and No with regard to the inclinations themselves.
While it might be impossible to cover every possible scenario, let's consider several simple policies. Enumerating every consequence may also be possible, but naming a few should help us to apply Kant's principle.
Personal maxims 1-3 (and 4 in the most restrictive case) fail the universalizability test, in that they each inflict harm to society and civilization when the individual maxim becomes a universal law. We can expect and can observe these same effects empirically at the individual scale.
Again, the applicability of these analyses depends on whether an inclination is acted on, or becomes a personal maxim of behavior. Hence it behooves us to differentiate in our language between merely experiencing a proclivity or perception and acting in such a way that embodies that perception as though it were true. We cannot apply the categorical imperative to circumstances, but we can apply it to behaviors.
