In the modern version of Pascal's wager argument, we assume an infinite value to ending up in heaven, and hence an infinite expected value for choosing to believe in god.
I do not understand why this should be the case. In general, it is a bad idea to place a bet on a highly unlikely option even if the rewards are great.
For example, if there is a lottery that will give a quadrillion dollars to one in quadrillion people and the cost of a lottery ticket is half a dollar (for a net expected value of 50 cents), you might as well not apply and save 50 cents because this event is so unlikely it might as well be impossible.
Indeed, it is only optimal to choose paths which maximize expected value if you have a large number of trials (a quadrillion in the lottery case). In Pascal's case there is only one trial in your hand.
Why should it be the case that we should still choose to maximize expected value (even though it is infinite)?