Suppose I see a tree through my window; I naturally believe that there's a tree outside. From my experience, I simply intuit (so it seems to me) the existence of that tree. Of course, I could reflect further on the fact, and turn a skeptical eye to it. Maybe my sight is deceiving me. But then I recall that it's pretty uncommon for that to happen on so grand a scale---and never to myself, as far as I can remember. So, upon considering this evidence, my intuition tells me to cease being skeptical about my seeing a tree. Of course, maybe my memory is faulty, but eventually my psychology will force me to abandon that skepticism too. And so it goes.

It seems to me that all knowledge "bottoms out" this way in intuition. Or, if you think I'm misusing the term 'intuition,' perhaps psychological prejudice would do as a substitute.

This is stackexchange, which means we can't debate the merits (or lack thereof) of such a view. Rather, my question is twofold:

(Q) Has something like this view been put forward by professional philosophers, and if so, (i) what is it called, and (ii) who espouses it?

Please note: I am not asking about foundationalism. In fact, AFAIK it's possible for one to hold the view I described above while at the same time rejecting foundationalism.

Thanks guys!

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    This sounds like a crude description of Husserl-style phenomenology, except he would find (naive) "intuition" and especially "psychological" (anything) objectionable. It reverses the order of grounding, empirical psychology ultimately "bottoms out" in the same phenomenological experience, hence its conceptual apparatus can not be used to ground it. Husserl even uses the tree example to a similar end in Ideas I. But trained ideal perception/categorial intuition is argued to filter out subjectivity and produce stable and objective knowledge. – Conifold Feb 29 '20 at 12:12
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    I wonder if you're asking how we know things. Russell sees this as the most basic philosophical question but has no answer. To answer it would require a study of consciousness so there is no answer to be found in scholastic philosophy and it must point vaguely to intuition and prejudice. It seems to me, as if does to you, that without a theory of 'knowing' we are forced to appeal to intuition and prejudice. The question then is, what do we man by 'intuition', and this returns us to a study of consciousness. – user20253 Mar 1 '20 at 12:43

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