Related, I suppose, to this question.
In mathematics most theorems are of the form:
If we have a [type of object] with [property 1] then it also has [property 2]
That is, they are conditional statements on classes of objects. Traditionally analytic philosophy, in its description of the objective world, has (in spite of its similarity, as being composed of arguments, with mathematics) dealt in absolutes rather than conditionals.
I am interested in whether there has been any move toward the conditional in analytic philosophy. Particularly intriguing, and most conceivable to me, is the prospect of a systematized relativism in which beliefs follow conditionally- has this been done? Or anything in this vein, for that matter?
I am well aware that in a strict logical sense any proposition is equivalent to a conditional, however it is in the latter sense alluded to in Joel's answer, that is:
in any situation in which the axioms are true (or in which the background assumptions are correct), then p
that I am referring to conditionals. I am however not alluding to the strict axiomatic method, so much as the application of analytic reasoning to non-trivial background assumptions. As I said above, most interesting to me would be if the background assumptions in question concerened the beliefs of an entity, together with certain assumptions relating to the entity's rationality, but anything of the broader putative genre would intrigue me greatly.