Epistemic pluralism’s potential slippery slope into epistemic nihilism

Question

William James long ago noted that:

“Up to about 1850 almost everyone believed that sciences expressed truths that were exact copies of a definite code of non-human realities. But the enormously rapid multiplication of theories in these lat¬ ter days has well-nigh upset the notion of any one of them being a more literally objective kind of thing than another. There are so many geometries, so many logics, so many physical and chemical hypotheses, so many classifications, each one of them good for so much and yet not good for everything, that the notion that even the truest formula may be a human device and not a literal transcript has dawned upon us.”

This, over the course of the 20th Century, has given rise to an [epistemic] pluralism that Michael P. Lynch has described as the notion that there are “incompatible but equally acceptable accounts of some subject matter.” This, he posits, gives rise to the problem of “finding room for objectivity inside the pluralist’s picture of the world.” That is the problem of "allowing for different truths without slipping into the nihilistic position that there is no truth at all."

The [potentially helpful] heuristic analogy, of course, is that of Dostoevsky’s observation in The Brothers Karamazov that if God does not exist everything is permitted. Anything goes.

So the question is [in the arguably extant ethos of “post truth” -- OED’s word of the year in 2016] should, and if so, how, does [the potentially slippery slope of] epistemic pluralism [with its associated concepts of diversity and inclusion] avoid a descent into epistemic nihilism (either innocently, or under the influence of the rhetorical tactics of bad faith actors)?

Answer 1

This is a very good question.

Epistemic nihilism is a rational construct, and as such it can only come second in our determination as to what we should do next. Rationality is a tool we have available to us to achieve what we want, it does not decide what we want.

Rationality is at the surface of our brain's activity. Most of what we understand about the world is intuitive. Intuition is essentially logical, but it works from our representation of the world. Some of that is essentially based on past perception, but, crucially, some is determined by our rational musings. Spend enough time convincing yourself that the world is a simulation, and your brain will take it on board that the world is a simulation, and from there your intuitions will logically reflect this assumption. We can convince ourselves of anything if we try hard enough.

Thus, any form of rational perspective, to the extent that we take it seriously, may become recycled into our intuitions. This is the weak point of rationality, when our intuitions come to support our reasoning because our reasoning have fed our intuitions. This explains dogmatism and apparent irrationality.

However, this won't affect what we want. It will only affect how we go about achieving what we want. It may turn out to be a hindrance but this is impossible to tell in advance. Different people believe different things and only some of them will be successful. Well, nothing really new here.

It also seems apparent that not all academics are radical sceptics. There seems to exist some level of diversity in metaphysical beliefs, which is the necessary ingredient to ensure that unorthodox points of view will remain expressed. Often, the major discoveries have come from outside the dogmatic consensus.

The question is a very good one, but the worry seems mundane: academics worrying about their posterity as a social class.

It is likely that radical scepticism affects how academics behave, but it won't make them stop wanting whatever humans want. It will only affect how they try to achieve what they want to achieve. Nobody knows that this could become a problem.

Yes, anything goes, but only as far as rationality is concerned. Rational people remain human beings and they cannot change their own nature. They cannot decide what they want. Rationality should be seen as the more adaptable part of our behaviour. We may believe that anything goes, but this in itself won't decide what we want. It can only help us achieve what we want, for good or bad.

Answer 2

It, in me humble opinion, depends on what definition of truth (knowable stuff) we employ. Epistemic nihilism, looks like, only has force if we subscribe to the correspondence theory of truth. The other two theories of truth - the coherence theory of truth and the pragmatic theory of truth - are immune to skepticism. We're not looking for truths, we're trying to make sense of the world (coherence) and/or do what's best for us (pragmatism).

Answer 3

Classical logic operates off the "All or Nothing" paradigm. And we intuitively think in classical logic terms, because that is how classic logic was developed (apply intuitive logic to itself, to identify faults in our intuitions, then correct them to produce the minimally modified intuitive logic that is coherent). This is why there is so much appeal to classical logic, to yes/no either/or thinking, and to ideologies and dogmas. We humans intuitively think that way.

We have, however, developed a completely different way of thinking which we do in parallel to our intuitive logic either/or. This is empiricism. Empiricism treats the "truth" as uncertain, and subject to investigation. And "truth" models as improvable. See for example sporting stars who, rather than declaring their play to be perfect, continually strive to improve upon excellence, for an example of tentative empiricism in action. Tentative empiricism leads to "likely" or useful answers, which are only locally valid. "Under these conditions, kicking the ball this way works well". The bundle of local answers that empiricism gives us is NOT and CANNOT be logically coherent. It is jsut a bundle of useful rules and guidelines that is incomplete, and may lead to many mutual contradictions.

Science is a formalization of our informal empiricism. As such, it is intrinsically incomplete, incoherent, and a pluralist amalgam of very different and incompatible models. This is a reality about science that rationalists, seeking their One True TRUTH, have tried to gloss over. Our more insightful philosophers of science -- James, Pierce, and Popper leading among them -- realized that science is incompatible with the rationalist vision of One True Truth. The spread of this realization has been a slow process, with many who lean toward science starting from the Logical Positivist view of science as a step-child of logic and an assistant in finding the One Truth.

But today, the consensus among philosophers of science is in favor of pluralism: that science can NEVER be integrated into One True Theory of Everything. AND that not all knowledge is discoverable thru science -- so science is one of several ways to discover "truths". See section 5 of the SEP article on scientific reduction: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-reduction/

Most of us humans STILL instinctively think in all/nothing either/or terms. And if pluralism is the case for our world, and even mighty science cannot by definition develop a logically coherent worldview -- then for all/nothing thinking there must be NO truths!!!

But Pragmatism offers a different answer. We have LOCAL truths -- ways to act, ways to think, that are IMMENSELY valuable. We need to learn these local truths, and abide by them. And when they end up in conflict, due to the intrinsic incoherence of pluralism -- there are BETTER and WORSE ways to try to resolve those conflicts. Dogmatism, and violence, are among the worst ways. Openness to self-doubt, dialog, compromise, and possible fusion into a new and mutually compatible local "truth", a Hegelian synthesis, are better ways.

To live in this world, we need to develop judgement, and operate thru humility. There is no formula that we can live by and just turn the crank and get the answer. Thinking thru how to live, is work, and work we need to do, and no answer we have will be the "final answer". But some answers are far better than others. This is the reply to nihilists and "post truth".

Answer 4

Arguing that epistemic pluralism is self-falsifying is a retorsion argument, which kind of argument was discussed extensively here. But there is another way to describe how epistemic pluralism might undermine itself:

Suppose person A says that they believe in, or use, method X to justify their beliefs. But A allows that many other Ys could be so used, etc. and there is no absolute vantage from which to judge between X, Y, and so on.

Now, B comes along and says, "According to my perspective, A doesn't actually disagree with me. Oh, they might sound like it, their X might sound unlike my Y, but according to A, there's no fact-of-the-matter about X as such, neither Y, so why can't I just interpret A as agreeing with me, regardless of what it sounds like A is saying with X?"

How, that is, can A claim that there is, absolutely, a plurality of viewpoints in the first place? How can they defend the idea that X and Y are actually opposed? But so this wouldn't be a self-falsifying pluralism; this would be a pluralism that negates its own conditions of meaningfulness. If pluralism is not sayable as absolute in some capacity, it is not sayable at all; or, it is impossible to differentiate, in the limit, from monism/absolutism more generally.

For broad discussion of disagreement, see the linked SEP article; on moral disagreement specifically, see that linked SEP article.

Answer 5

Personally I would partition the 'is' from the 'ought.'

The 'is' and the 'ought' can be philosophically denoted as epistemology and axiology respectively. I think this distinction is an important one to make when discussing any type of pluralism, because through this partition you can form a belief pluralism and a moral pluralism.

There are those who will debate whether two plus two equals four or five, a belief pluralism, and there are those who will debate whether men wearing dresses is right or wrong, a moral pluralism. In belief pluralism, you can use an array of methods invoking the goal of obtaining truth and avoiding error. In moral pluralism, your arguments are more subjective in nature, calling on past experience or evidence from some 'objective superiority,' like a religious text, etc.

I find comfort in realizing moral pluralism is just as much epistemology as it is axiology. Morals can't be objectively more valid than other morals; however, morals can be obtained and altered through one's environmental experience via an objective process. The epistemology is understanding how every wave of light, every wave of sound, every force and particle to ever interact with your body alters the molecular structure of your nervous system, determining totally your axiological beliefs.