William James long ago noted that:
“Up to about 1850 almost everyone believed that sciences expressed truths that were exact copies of a definite code of non-human realities. But the enormously rapid multiplication of theories in these lat¬ ter days has well-nigh upset the notion of any one of them being a more literally objective kind of thing than another. There are so many geometries, so many logics, so many physical and chemical hypotheses, so many classifications, each one of them good for so much and yet not good for everything, that the notion that even the truest formula may be a human device and not a literal transcript has dawned upon us.”
This, over the course of the 20th Century, has given rise to an [epistemic] pluralism that Michael P. Lynch has described as the notion that there are “incompatible but equally acceptable accounts of some subject matter.” This, he posits, gives rise to the problem of “finding room for objectivity inside the pluralist’s picture of the world.” That is the problem of "allowing for different truths without slipping into the nihilistic position that there is no truth at all."
The [potentially helpful] heuristic analogy, of course, is that of Dostoevsky’s observation in The Brothers Karamazov that if God does not exist everything is permitted. Anything goes.
So the question is [in the arguably extant ethos of “post truth” -- OED’s word of the year in 2016] should, and if so, how, does [the potentially slippery slope of] epistemic pluralism [with its associated concepts of diversity and inclusion] avoid a descent into epistemic nihilism (either innocently, or under the influence of the rhetorical tactics of bad faith actors)?