I'm going to follow Habermas here, and assert that what we mean by 'reasoning' is an effort to use language to convince some person of normativity, such as the rightness, goodness, propriety, acceptability, or similar positive valuation of a belief or action. With that in mind, there are four basic modes of rationality:
- Teleological rationality: an amoral, goal-oriented, 'ends justifies the means' form of reasoning similar to the political concept of realpolitik or the economic principles of game theory or rational actor theory, where we convince others of the 'rightness' of our behavior by succeeding at tasks or accomplishing goals.
- Normative rationality: a form of reasoning that reflects back on pre-given, authoritative norms that are held to be true a priori. We try convince others by pointing at authoritative texts or utterances, resting on the authority of the text or utterance to carry our case.
- Dramaturgical rationality: Reasoning that calls on the sincerity, authenticity, or virtue of the speaker to convey the 'rightness' of what is said. One convinces others by saying (e.g.) "I am a good, righteous person, so you can trust what I say is true."
- Communicative rationality: A form of reasoning that focuses solely on the argument itself, without regard to questions of practicality, authority, or personal integrity. This, perhaps, is the never-achieved ideal of intellectual discussion.
Generally when people use the word 'argument' (in the sense of a set of reasoning that one presents to others), we tend to think we mean it in the last sense. But the passage presented in the question is clearly not communicative rationality as defined; it's a form of normative rationality, which is attempting to convince the reader of its 'rightness' by reference to certain authoritative values given a priori within a religious worldview. There is certainly reasoning going on in the passage: all of Habermas' categories are thoughtful, they merely use different metrics of persuasion. But this reasoning is not he intellectual/academic type that develops intricate chains of logical associations to reach a conclusion; nor is it the teleological type that only seeks specific goals; nor does it rest entirely on the credibility and persuasiveness of any particular speaker.
To the extent that this passage represents an effort to convince others of the 'rightness' of a particular attitude, it can be considered an argument. But it is an argument of the normative form — aiming to convince others by exhorting them to follow authoritatively dictated principles — not an intellectual argument as we might normally be inclined to use the term. It is a different form of persuasion, which is useful, valid, and effective within appropriate contexts, but not within every context.