A link to the paper is here:
So in the paper Quine gives two types of analytic statements:
- No unmarried man is married.
- No bachelor is married.
So for Quine, the second statement is problematic and the subject of the paper.
My concern is with the first statement, and specifically what he says about it here:
"' If we suppose a prior inventory of logical particles, comprising 'no,' 'un-' 'if,' 'then,' 'and,' etc., then in general a logical truth is a statement which is true and remains true under all reinterpretations of its components other than the logical particles."
But how could we make such an inventory of logical particles... and why wouldn't they be subject to the same issues of synonymy as bachelor? These logical particles arrive in language in an organic way just as words like bachelor do.
Now perhaps we could construct a purely artificial notation for logical operators for the sole purpose of logical deduction... but to use them we'd have to describe them in terms of words we already know.. But those words we know will have issues of synonymy. So we get an infinite regress...
So doesn't Quine have to throw out logical truths of any kind?