Proof that I am the only observer in the world

Question

Let’s assume there are multiple observers (or perspectives or “cameras”) viewing the world. Every person has one. However, I know that I am one of these observers.

Therefore, there needs to be a flag or property in the world which contains the information needed to tell which perspective my life becomes. In particular, who is me. However, from another person’s point of view, this flag points to them, not me. This is impossible, since this is a universal flag. Hence, I am the only perspective there is.

If we assume, each person has their own world, with their own flags that points to them, then there needs to be another flag outside of this, which tells which world I will be in for the life I’m living now. For another observer, this would be pointing at their world. It is not possible for the flag to take on multiple values.

If the flag can take on multiple values at the same time, there would still need to be another flag, which tells which value I should select from the first flag in order to live the life I live now. So in the end, there will always be one flag in the world that will point to me, and to nobody else. This proves I am the only observer in the world and the world is unique to me.

Where is the flaw?

Answer 1

If I understand it, I think this is a very powerful argument and might lead to "open individualism"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_individualism

I'm having trouble following the details in your argument. Let me phrase it a bit differently and you can clarify if this is essentially what you're getting at.

We have two bodies (or organisms) in the world, B1 and B2. B1 thinks... why am I B1 and not B2... we could have the same world, with the same two bodies, but where I experience it as B2 instead of B1.

So he assumes there's some additional facts about the world that cause this difference. One move might be for B1 to say, I'm actually a soul S1. And there's a soul S2 experiencing B2.

So this gives 2 possible worlds: 1) S1 experiences B1, and S2 experiences B2. 2) S1 experiences B2, and S2 experiences B1.

But this would be a mistake... because now S1 can ask the same question... why am I S1 and not S2... Using the same reasoning as before S1 presumes he's really a super-soul SS1. This leads to an infinite regress.

From my point of view, there are two possibilities:

1. The subject/content model of experience is somehow mistaken... This whole exercise comes from the view that one can separate the content of experience from the subject. Maybe this separation is mistaken.

2. There's only one subject of experience as you said. But this need not lead to solipsism (my current perspective is the only one). The same subject may experience all perspectives. That's the open individualism idea.

Answer 2

There is one way to prove that I am not the only mind in the world . Take a concept such as love . To feel love is to presuppose that there is person who is the object of my love . Other emotional states imply or presuppose the existence of others . Now imagine that what I say is false . Imagine that I have such states even when there are no others . How then do I come by such states ? It seems absurd to say that I come by them by way of my own mind . To think is to think about something and that something is the cause of my thought .

Answer 3

I mentioned the paper "A Puzzle about Further Facts" (Erkenntnis, 2019, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-018-9979-6) in the comments above. I think the most relevant passage from that paper is the following. (The context here -- "Case B" -- is that the protagonist, Fonda, is seeing a simulated world through the perspective of a creature, Alpha, but has forgotten that this is the case, putting her in a similar epistemic situation as ourselves. The question is whether she is right to conclude that there are further facts, i.e., that a different perspective, say Beta's, could have appeared to her, and therefore that there is something else to know about the world, like the flag that you mention, with all the consequences thereof.)

Certainly it is true that a different agent’s perspective could be made to appear to her; all this would require is a change to the code governing which perspective is displayed by the VR system. But would she be justified in believing that a different perspective could have appeared to her? Again, it seems that the moment we allow her to remember even just the mere fact that she is in a simulation, even if she remembers nothing else about her identity in the outside world, she can indeed conclude that a different agent’s perspective could have been made to appear to her. But we explicitly rule out such a memory in Case B. Hence, it is not clear that the notion of a different perspective appearing to her makes sense from Fonda’s perspective. For all she knows, she is Alpha, and how could any perspective other than Alpha’s appear to Alpha?

While the author states that this kind of reasoning seems the best way to avoid concluding that there exist further facts (= additional flags) if one seeks to avoid that conclusion, he does not endorse such reasoning either, saying the argument is "in need of further fleshing out" and explicitly leaves open the possibility of concluding that there are indeed further facts.

Also relevant is the paper "Against egalitarianism" (Analysis, 2013, see also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vertiginous_question) in which the author (Hellie) argues:

The Hellie-subject: why is it me? Why is it the one whose pains are ‘live’, whose volitions are mine, about whom self-interested concern makes sense? That thing there in the objective world: what is so special about it? Why doesn’t some other subject of experience there in the objective world ‘go live’ in this way: for instance, the ‘Chalmers-subject’ out there driving around in the human being whose visage matches a photo on a certain driver’s license bearing the name ‘David Chalmers’—why not instead it?

This "vertiginous question" by Hellie also seems to pose a challenge to "open individualism" and related theories, because those theories still doesn't seem to answer the question: they do not make any deep distinction between (e.g.) Hellie and Chalmers.

As pointed out in the comments by someone else, this question: Why am I this particular human being? is closely related and there are a lot more references there.

Answer 4

I may be missing something essential, but it seems to me that the underlying “issue” here is more or less the issue you raised in your post How can there be multiple "points of view" in the world?.

In response, I would ask you to review Spinoza’s and Leibnitz’s arguments in favor of substance monism: a system where all things are conceived as modes of a single substance. Then consider that solipsism is the philosophical idea that only one's mind is sure to exist. As an epistemological position, solipsism holds that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure; the external world and other minds cannot be known and might not exist outside the mind.

All of this should be appraised in the context Wittgenstein’s perspective that “Philosophy is [or should be] a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.” (see Philosophical Investigations, sec. 109).

Finally, with Wittgenstein’s caveat in mind, reread @Conifold’s comments in response to your November 2019 post, which, is seems to me, adequately identifies the flaw you seek:

“Not everything included in the world is a "thing", properties and states of things aren't things, and neither are experiences. Points of view aren't "assigned", point of view of experience of point of view is just nonsensical. The paradox is based on first reifying experiences into "things", then separating them from that which they are experiences of, and finally "puzzling" over how to put those back together. Subjective experiences are not "things", they do not float apart from their subjects, so there is no problem of "assigning" them to those either….What I am saying is that "had my subjective experience been the subjective experience of someone else" makes no more sense than "had squares been round". It is oxymoronic, and illustrates our freedom to string words together. But squareness of squares is not detachable from the squares, and we do not go puzzling over squareness and roundness getting "assigned" to squares and circles.”