Empirical discoveries about our brain and behavior might tell us that we don’t have as much conscious control as we think we have (Wegner 2003; Libet 1999). (For critique of arguments claiming that recent scientific research has shown that “conscious will is an illusion”, see Mele 2009, some of the essays in Sinnott-Armstrong & Nadel 2011 and Roskies & Nahmias 2016.) And there are worries, arising from certain versions of physicalism, that our mental states don’t have the causal powers we think they have (Kim 1998). But these threats to free will have nothing to do with determinism.
It seems intuitive to me that denying the existence of free will implies affirming determinism. Nonetheless, according to the last sentence, it appears that one can deny the existence of free will without being committed to determinism. I am confused.
Just because there are philosophical problems with freewill and determinism together, it does not mean there are problems with non-determinism and no freewill together. Non-determinism and no freewill don't have the same compatibility issues as freewill and determinism.
Try to imagine a situation where some being doesn't have freewill. All its actions are occurring due to external influences which it cannot actually affect. It's just along for the ride and behaves according to it's nature. There's nothing that requires such influences to be deterministic. It could still be a process which includes random elements, so that there are different possibilities for what can occur; but the being has no personal agency over those processes, possibilities, or results. It would have no freewill, and the universe would not follow the exact chain of cause-and-effect that determinism suggests. This doesn't present the same type of problems as a combination of freewill and determinism.
If we have no free will then determinism is true . By determinism I mean that every event has a cause and all past events are the consequence of prior causes that either are or are not within our control . I say within our control because some ( Honderick ) speak of agents as a source of origination and so free though determined . I doubt this is possible given the meaning of determinism . At best we are lucky to be free - compare the freedom you have not to take a drink compared to that of the alcoholic . Both are not free ( in the normal of free will ) when determinism is true .
No. Picture a 'human puppet' whose limbs are controlled from outside the body - e.g a human dangling from marionette strings. Now imagine the strings are pulled at the behest of a randomness generator - to pin this down, let us assume 'true Quantum-Mechanical randomness' not a computer's RNG. Then as the human has no control over their body, I believe it can be asserted that the human has no free will (at least where motion is concerned), but the body's behavior is certainly not deterministic.
Since the term "denial" most often only refers to an assertion bereft of supporting reasoning we can't conclude anything (other than the fact than an assertion has been made) on the basis of mere denial.
The actual non-existence of free-will would logically entail determinism or randomness. Since it is self-evident that there is order in the universe we can rule out randomness. Most people are unaware that the genetic algorithm of Darwin's theory requires a fitness function that instructs the selection process of natural selection.