SEP's entry on Arguments for Incompatibilism contains a curious passage:
Empirical discoveries about our brain and behavior might tell us that we don’t have as much conscious control as we think we have (Wegner 2003; Libet 1999). (For critique of arguments claiming that recent scientific research has shown that “conscious will is an illusion”, see Mele 2009, some of the essays in Sinnott-Armstrong & Nadel 2011 and Roskies & Nahmias 2016.) And there are worries, arising from certain versions of physicalism, that our mental states don’t have the causal powers we think they have (Kim 1998). But these threats to free will have nothing to do with determinism.
It seems intuitive to me that denying the existence of free will implies affirming determinism. Nonetheless, according to the last sentence, it appears that one can deny the existence of free will without being committed to determinism. I am confused.