Those familiar with the architectonic nature of Immanuel Kant's philosophy argue about the difference between the three critiques (Critique of Pure Reason; Critique of Practical Reason; and the Critique of Judgment) and his popular writings and lectures completed after 1790. While Calvin O. Schrag suggests that Kant's transcendental or critical philosophy is not complete without Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone, neo-Kantians like Ernst Cassirer contend that Kant should have written a fourth critique providing a phenomenology of culture. Cassirer associates his paramount Philosophy of Symbolic Forms as fulfilling this role. Is Kant's critical philosophy fully articulated with the third critique where his later works are just regurgitation or should we infer a deepening of his thought by incorporating a philosophy of religion or culture? How are we to judge and situate the character of Kant's architectonic, which seems to be systematic but not prone to the confines of system-building?
Understanding presupposes judgments or subsumption. The analysis of determinative judgment (particulars under generals) in the first critique presupposes the other cognitive powers (reason, imagination, judgment) treated in the second and third critiques under the domain of action and the purposiveness of reflective judgments (particulars in search of universals). Kant asks how we could even be aware of intuitions and synthesizing of the sensible manifold without reflective distance. Further, aesthetic judgments of taste (feelings) are pre-cognitive and non-cognitive. Kant addresses this in sections 39 and 40 of the third through the notion of sensus communis and universal communicability. So although the cognitive powers conform to the lawfulness of the understanding, they each have an independent legislative function. But more importantly, it seems that computers and other technologies can perform the mental operations laid out in the treatment of the understanding in the first critique. I have understood the transcendental philosophy accounting for the fuller human context when he gives shades of a philosophy of culture in section 83 of the third critique and the anthropology. So I am more inclined to accept that the critical philosophy does not arbitrarily favor or subordinate any of the cognitive powers, but they are posited as equiprimordial.