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It is unclear what the 'will to power' means, and if it is about the world

The will to power doctrine seems to claim that everything that exists rests fundamentally on an underlying basis of “power-centers”, whose activity and interactions are explained by a principle that they pursue the expansion of their power. But it is far from obvious what these “power-centers” are supposed to be, fundamentally, and much scholarly controversy concerns what kind of doctrine Nietzsche intended to advance, in the first place... Maudemarie Clark (2000, see also 1990: 205–44) reads the will to power as a strand of thought that makes no claim about the world, but instead expresses Nietzsche’s values

but it may be an explanation of every human drive, psychology

Nietzsche proposes to understand psychology “as morphology and the doctrine of the development of the will to power” (BGE 23). Some commentators take this to suggest a monistic psychology in which all drives whatsoever aim at power, and so count as manifestations of a single underlying drive (or drive-type).... Reginster’s view redirects attention away from drives’ first-order aims toward a general structural feature of drives—their tendency to overcome resistance in the course of pursuing whatever first-order activities they pursue

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/#WillPowe

I like the idea that the "will to power" is about the world -- psychology only indirectly -- and similar to the conception of objects taking up space, and Kant's "a priori" "empirical conception", something necessary to the conception of the world -- but that it also explains the underlying drive to all drives.

I like that idea because it'd help me get to grips with what exactly Nietzsche was transvaluating, allow an analysis of what drives amount to.

Supposing transvaluation is the goal, then would that be dialectical, and are we driven -- as the meaning of life and the earth -- toward Aufheben?

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  • I am a little confused by the title. Nietzsche considered infatuation with Hegelian dialectic a folly of his youth, although his thought arguably still bears the hallmarks of it. But even then, Aufheben, in Hegel and Nietzsche, is a means rather than an end:"I had to aufheben morality, in order to put my moral will through". If anything, it is putting through the will (to power) that is the meaning. And, given the Schopenhauerian roots of the Will, it is not "toward" anything, it is a drive in itself. – Conifold May 4 '20 at 5:10
  • again, i find your comment unclear. i say that the drive is "toward" aufheben, not the "will". and don't mention ends in themselves – user46524 May 4 '20 at 6:00

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