Now, each of us knows that only one first person perspective among all
perspectives has the property of "mine", but for each of us, this
"mine" property corresponds to a different perspective. However, this
would imply that ALL first person perspectives have the property of
"mine", and that is in direct contradiction to what I'm experiencing,
since I only have one of the perspectives, not the others.
Possible hegelian style sophism. A, B , C , D, etc are different and distinct from one another. But, they all share in " difference" , and being different is what they have in common. So finally A, B , C , D, etc are identical.
- As I understand your reflection , your " givens" seem to be :
(1) There are many perspectives
(2) One of them is mine
(3) There must be something that makes this perspective " mine".
- But maybe does this amount to " reifying" one's "perspective".
I mean , if my " perspective" is simply another name for the "mine-ness" of my experiences, then there is only one thing, and there is no point in asking how this particular perspective can " gain" the additional property of being "mine".
(3) So the real problem is to account for this " mine-ness" quality of experience.
Maybe the individuation principle of experiences is each one's body. My pain is not your pain, because my pain is felt at another point of space than yours, namely in my body, not in yours.
Maybe is individuation a law of thought, of mental processes.
According to Locke ( Essay, II, 27) , thought, involving essentially reflection, constitutes and produces, in a retrospective way , at every time, the identity of a personal subject , and this is what acccounts to the fact that " I am to myself what I call myself".
According to Sartre ( Being And Nothingness) , even though consciousness is always " intentional " ( consciousness of something) it could not tend to an object without, at the same time, being conscious of tending to it. Therefore, it is a law of consciousness that it is always " consciousness of cousciousness"; what we call the " Self" is nothing else than this reflexivity ( self-relation) of consciousness, that is the self-appearing-to-itself of consciousness ( though not as an object that is known).
Note : Sartre explicitly rejects the reflection account of reflexivity ( i.e. of the relation of consciousness to itself)
Reference : https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological/#PreRefSelCon
- According to Husserl ( Cartesian Meditations, V), the " mine-ness" of my experiences is not an original property , but a derived one. It is only through the experience of the Other that I discover that my consciousness is only one possible perspective on the world : I discover that my " here" is not an absolute one, that is, that my " here" is also a " there" from another point of view.
(3) Another strategy would be to account for psychic individuaality in terms of pragmatics. It is the very fact of uttering the pronoun " I" that makes you yourself. Remember Descartes ( Meditations, II) : " This proposition I am is necessarily true, every time I utter it"