The SEP discussion on the Problem of Perception notes that Sense-Datum Theory is criticized, and apparently rejected by most philosophers. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/ The reasons given appear at first review to me to be nonsense from a scientific POV. The first given is a critique of the uncertainty about our perceptions at comes from indirect realism:
Some of these objections are objections specifically to the indirect realist version of the sense-datum theory: for example, the claim that the theory gives rise to an unacceptable “veil of perception” between the mind and the world. The idea is that the sense-data “interpose” themselves between perceivers and the mind-independent objects which we normally take ourselves to be perceiving, and therefore leaves our perceptual, cognitive and epistemic access to the world deeply problematic if not impossible.
The second is an objection to treating experiences as data:
The objection is that the Phenomenal Principle is fallacious. It is not built into the meaning of “something appears F to one” that “one is aware of an F thing”.
The third is a rejection of sense-datum based on "naturalism":
Naturalism (or physicalism) says that the world is entirely physical in its nature: everything there is supervenes on the physical, and is governed by physical law. Many sense-datum theorists are committed to the claim that non-ordinary sense-data are mind-dependent: objects whose existence depends on the existence of states of mind.
For the first, science operates through the veil of ignorance. We do not directly perceive electron valences, or the valence structure that creates the periodic table in chemistry. We do not directly perceive ecological niches, or population dynamics, or societal norms, or energy conservation, or -- basically EVERYTHING that the sciences work with. The first objection -- is a rejection of science!!!
The second -- I don't even understand. Treating observations as data is not, and cannot be a fallacy! This is just empiricism!
The third -- once more comes across as nonsense. A central discovery of the science of neurology -- is that our brains do a MASSIVE amount of processing, and our perceptions -- are NOT direct, but instead are only occasional, highly selective, filtered, and pre-processed https://www.amazon.com/Incognito-Secret-Lives-David-Eagleman/dp/0307389928 And infant and child development studies show our worldviews is an incremental construct https://opentextbc.ca/introductiontopsychology/chapter/6-2-infancy-and-childhood-exploring-and-learning/
For a second reference, the IEP discussion on the objects of perception spells out that anti-dualism is the primary reason to reject sense-datum theory: https://www.iep.utm.edu/perc-obj/
Many see a problem with respect to the metaphysics of sense data. Sense data are seen as inner objects, objects that among other things are colored. Such entities, however, are incompatible with a materialist view of the mind. When I look at the coffee cup there is not a material candidate for the yellow object at which I am looking. Crudely: there is nothing in the brain that is yellow. Sense data, then, do not seem to be acceptable on a materialist account of the mind, and thus, the yellow object that I am now perceiving must be located not in the material world but in the immaterial mind. Indirect realism is committed to a dualist picture within which there is an ontology of non-physical objects alongside that of the physical.
This appears to be philosophers rejecting the scientific method and worldview relative to perception for a series of pretty clearly invalid reasons, -- because it supports a conclusion (dualism) that most philosophers dislike.
Am I missing something, either are these objections more forceful, or is there a better set of reasons to reject sense-datum theory? And is this rejection NOT a rejection of the methods and assumptions common to the rest of science?