Source : Paul Vincent Spade, Survey Of Medieval Philoosphy (https://pvspade.com/Logic/index.html)

Dunst Scotus is said to hold the thesis of univocity of being: i.e. the thesis according to which the concept of being is attributed in the same sense to God and to creatures.

Note: In medieval philosophy, the "standard" thesis regarding this question is an analogy of being (the being concept is neither equivocal nor equivocal); Descartes is known for adopting the anti-medieval thesis of equivocity.

However, Scotus is also said to have a disconinuist view of the realm of being ; that is (according to Paul Vincent Spade in his Survey Of Medieval Philosophy) , there is no nature (essence) that is common to God and to creatures.

How are these two theses compatible?

If our univocal concept of being is to be objectively grounded, it seems necessary that it should conrrespond to a "common nature". But if there is no nature common to God and to creatures, what will do the job of grounding the universal concept of being?

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    See SEP's entry on John Duns Sc otus as well as IEP's one for some details about Scotus' doctrine of the univocity of being. "Aquinas and Scotus agree that we cannot know the essence of God in this life. The main difference between the two authors is that Scotus believes we can apply certain predicates univocally—with exactly the same meaning—to God and creatures, whereas Aquinas insists that this is impossible." – Mauro ALLEGRANZA May 25 '20 at 13:19
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    "Scotus says that we can come up with a relatively simple concept that is proper to God alone, the concept of “infinite being.” Now that concept might seem to be every bit as composite as “highest good” or “first cause,” but it’s really not. For “infinite being” is a concept of something essentially one: a being that has infinity (unlimitedness) as its intrinsic way of existing." – Mauro ALLEGRANZA May 25 '20 at 13:22

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