The big book of scientific knowledge is written in the language of mathematics. Four hundred years of work in this area as shown that regardless of what philosophers or physicists might think about this, it nonetheless is a fact that the use of mathematics to organize knowledge about the physical world is (to some) unreasonably effective.
As such, the reliability of science and the successes that spring from it is a circumstance which its practitioners are under absolutely no obligation to justify to the philosophy community.
For example, take the case of shooting extremely high-energy electrons at protons, as a tool for determining whether or not the protons possess any internal structure, and if so, what exactly that structure might consist of. This is the stuff of which Nobel prizes are made.
So: in what sense would this work, carried out at Stanford's SLAC facility in the late 1960's, have been in any way productively informed by having philosophers involved in the process of designing the magnetic spectroscopes that were used to make measurements on electron-proton scattering?
