Aristotle asks at the close of Book VIII, Chapter 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics: Can one wish their friend the highest good, namely, to be a god? He seems to provide several reasons to think not.
First, Aristotle claims that if x wished for y to be a god, then x would lose a good, namely, that of friendship. This presumes humans cannot be friends with gods. This is plausible, since Aristotle also suggests friendship requires need, and gods don't need anything, so they don't have friends.
However, in Chapter 12 Aristotle seems to count it as possible that humans can be friends with gods, claiming this is on par with friendship between children and parents. Friendship requires proportionality. Children can never repay parents for bringing them into existence, but they can honor them in other ways to maintain proportionality. Similarly, we can honor gods to maintain proportionality. See also Chapter 14, "Friendship seeks what can be done, not what accords with merit, because it's not possible in every case, such as honor to the gods or one's parents."
Second, Aristotle claims that x must always wish for the good of y with respect to whatever y is, "whatever that may be." The sorts of cases he considers include 'kings' and 'the wise', i.e. a king's friend wishes goods befitting a king for the king, rather than, say, goods befitting a merchant. But this seems to entail that paupers who're friends can't wish each other to be kings, since that'd be a good befitting a king rather than a pauper. That seems mistaken.
I'm a bit perplexed here. On the one hand, Aristotle seems to be claiming we can't wish our friends be gods because we can't be friends with gods, then taking that justification back later without returning to the question of whether we can wish our friends be gods. On the other hand, he seems to constrain wishing goods for our friends too narrowly, and so that seems flimsy justification for dismissing wishing one's friend the highest good.
Please do help this fly out of the bottle...